

## IMMIGRATION AND AMERICA'S UNCHOSEN FUTURE

An NPG Forum Paper

By Otis Graham, Jr.

*Those who stay and struggle to change things for the better—the Lech Walesas of the world—are the real heroes.*

— John Tanton

*It is possible that things will not get better than they are now, or have been known to be. It is possible we are past the middle now...Now we are being given tickets, and they are not tickets to the show we had been thinking of, but to a different show, clearly inferior.*

—Robyn Sarah, “Riveted”

*And gentlemen in England, now a-bed shall think themselves accurs'd they were not here and hold their manhoods cheap whiles any speaks that fought with us upon Saint Crispin's Day.*

—William Shakespeare, *Henry V*

### America Headed in the Wrong Direction

The first decade of the twenty-first century brought the United States a mix of conflicting and mostly unsettling indicators of where the nation was headed, and public opinion polls registered a steady increase in pessimism. Presidential candidates in 2008 encountered a public telling pollsters that 81 percent of them “say the nation is headed on the wrong track,” reported *The New York Times* in April, 2008, the highest level of dissatisfaction with the country's direction since polls asked this question in the early 1990s. Public loss of confidence had plenty of sources—a stalled economy further weakened in the autumn, 2008, by a collapse of financial institutions, a widening gap between lower/middle and elite classes, a mounting public debt, surging petroleum prices with predictions of an historic peaking of global production as demand insatiably grew, predictions of disruptive climate warming atop pre-existing environmental troubles from agriculture to oceans, repeated evidence of governmental incompetence including a misguided and costly war in Iraq as the main response to the terrorist threat.

Was another major cause of public worry the four decades of ever-larger runaway immigration invited by the 1965 Act, one-third of that influx now illegal? This took time to work its way up the “it's broken” list. Mainly negative public responses to polls about large-scale immigration, especially the illegal sort, persisted on the edges of public discourse through the last three decades of the twentieth century. Yet the issue was politically contained, making no appearance in the presidential elections of 1968, 1972, 1976, 1980, 1984, 1988, 1992, 1996, 2000, or 2004. Then, late in 2007 as the 2008 presidential campaigns geared up, there it was in the large—immigration as one of the top five issues agitating the public and discomfiting the presidential candidates.

How did it get there? The expansionist 1965 Act and subsequent liberalizations rode on the wings of a myth about our national immigration experience—that, however large and however composed, immigration had brought and always would bring only good things, Einsteins and Gershwins and boatloads of nation-building workers and settlers, taking English and civics classes at night. That myth about the costless impacts of

immigration eras far back in the national story joined with a new multiculturalist ideology to stifle public criticism when it began to mount in and after the 1980s. Criticism escalated because the myths were no guide to modern America as it absorbed post-1965 mass immigration. The sustained arrival of foreigners, invited and uninvited, brought rising costs felt acutely in the middle and working class layers of American life—labor market competition, fiscal costs to local and state governments. While elites happily employed cheap immigrant labor in suburban homes and watering holes, in agribusiness and meat factories, most Americans over four decades of mass immigration experienced escalating costs in their neighborhoods, schools, hospitals and other social infrastructure. These costs were felt first in the four southwestern border states, but by the end of the twentieth century had expanded across the south and midwest, deep into New England and the pacific northwest. Daily life in neighborhoods and communities was the incubator of social resentment.

Our multi-voiced social movement to change immigration policy and patterns worked to accelerate this social learning, generating a now-bulging shelf of books, reports, articles and organizational newsletters, lectures, conferences and meetings small and large, information-filled e-mails, and blogs and letters to editors.

The daily experience in American communities combined with gales of critical fact and analysis from our reduction movement's verbalizers and communicators taught a growing majority of the public to understand that our era's mass intake, almost half of it in violation of law, is not a welcome repeat of the familiar nation-building formula that led us to global pre-eminence. Instead, it is now a major current carrying our communities and nation to a place we and our children do not want to go—and thus deserves its place high on the national “worry and must change” list. Reductionist energies broke through in California and elsewhere in the 1990s. Then 9/11 came, and our porous border vulnerabilities increased the pressure of public dissatisfaction with the decades-long bipartisan laxity in immigration law enforcement. The immigration issue reached presidential politics within both parties in 1907-08 as a small-sized gorilla that no candidate was willing or able to dodge or turn to advantage.

This was half of the story of modern

immigration politics, the half I have tried in this book to reconstruct as I saw it. As John Tanton and others had predicted in the 1970s, decades of large-scale immigration, especially when it came disproportionately from nearby Mexico, would in time generate mounting demands for a very different sort of “reform”—moving from a regime of very porous borders to essentially no borders at all.

So there has emerged, in time for the 2008 presidential election and sure to extend beyond it, two sharply different reform efforts. Perhaps both should be called social movements—one of them unlike all other American social movements, in that its foot soldiers when summoned into the streets were mostly illegal foreigners whose basic loyalties were suggested by the Mexican and Central American banners they carried.

The battle is now fully joined, at last. In 1978, founding FAIR, we did not think it would take so long for most Americans to see that this immigration era was a mistake. And I cannot recall any of us warning that the alliance responsible for mass immigration would never rest until all borders were down and immigration had no limits.

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Where is this four-decade Big Immigration era taking us? In the debate over the expansionist reforms of 1965, its sponsors assured us that the proposed new system would not make immigration flows larger, but it did and does. And that it would not change America in unwelcome ways, but it did and does.

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## Where Immigration is Taking America

As to population size, the Immigration Act of 1965 and subsequent expansionist laws and lax administration diverted the U.S. from the demographic path it was on toward a stabilized population—probably at 240 million, demographer Leon Bouvier estimates, if immigration had remained at pre-1965 levels. Instead, expanding immigration made this nation the fastest-growing developed society, likely to reach 500 million by 2040 and still robustly expanding. Foreigners, at congressional invitation, have cancelled the growth stabilization path chosen by American citizens. A CIS paper in 2007 calculated from Census Bureau data that the

current level of immigration (1.25 million a year) will add 105 million to the nation's population by 2060. Immigrants and their children account for more than 80 percent of U.S. population growth. Average citizens intuitively understand that a policy producing half a billion Americans, and rising, means more traffic, urban congestion, environmental degradation, extinction of species of wildlife, and resource shortages from petroleum to fresh and potable water. Continued population growth in a country of our size had become, as the Rockefeller Commission said a generation ago, "an intensifier or multiplier of many problems impairing the quality of life in the U.S."

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These and other costs of population growth must now be framed within a larger new context established by the warming of the planet. The most recent calculations of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change foresee a warming of 3.5-7 degrees Fahrenheit, producing among other things melting glaciers and the Arctic ice cap, inundating coastal areas where one-sixth of humanity now lives; fiercer hurricanes; an increase of the geographical range of tropical diseases; expanded desertification; radical alterations of agricultural economies bringing more painful disruptions than benefits; the possibility of a collapse of the gulf stream resulting in radical changes in European climate; and the possibility of oceanic acidification with unknown results.

The effort to curb the increase and if possible reduce greenhouse gases in the atmosphere proceeds now at the level of feel-good gestures from individuals who are "helping the environment" by buying a hybrid car or cycling to work; of brags from corporations claiming "greener" products and processes; of pledges from towns, cities and states that by a date certain they will somehow reduce their "carbon footprint" to this or that target in order to solve the problem. The price of the de-carbonization of our society will be much higher (and also the benefits) than these newly-greened Americans imagine. Americans, their political leaders coming last, will soon figure out that the necessity of reducing carbon emissions will require painful reductions and shifts in energy use. Then, inevitably, the realization will spread that such sacrifices grow a bit larger every time an immigrant or immigrant's baby enlarges the American population base that is trying to stay within acceptable emission

limits. All future immigrants and their children, and all babies born to American families over 2.1 fertility per woman, move the goalposts back. Immigration reduction is an essential policy tool in all environmental policy efforts, including sharply curbing the emission of greenhouse gases. Policymakers and the public did not yet make the connection between growing environmental and resource problems and the expanding population that immigration brought, and a series of prominent ads in print media in mid-2008, posted by a coalition of four of our reductionist groups, drew no rebuttals or any other public comment.

This slowly emerging perspective on the collateral damage inflicted on the global environment by America's high and rising population levels cannot be confined only to our citizens. The prospect of more heavy-footprint Americans is one in which foreigners have some stake that cannot indefinitely escape them. In a recent best-selling book, *Collapse*, UCLA geographer Jared Diamond pointed out that we affluent, high consumption Americans consume thirty-two times the resources, and produce thirty-two times the wastes as inhabitants of the Third World. This huge American footprint grows even more crushing and costly as we add Americans to the total, which is one of the contributions of the immigration policy in place since 1965.

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As these troubles intensify, the world's population is projected to rise from today's near-7 billion to 9-10 billion, worsening global ecological degradation and resource stringency. Rising numbers will be dislodged and turned into environmental and/or political refugees from failed states plagued by civil wars over ethnic divisions or water. Global warming will accelerate this human flight from homelands, especially where coastal regions are inundated and agricultural patterns disrupted. The pressure on the West of swelling numbers of migrating refugees will intensify, and the basic scenario of *Golden Venture* and even *Camp of the Saints* will be repeated many times. "How many should go where?," two Indian economists writing in *The New York Times* in May, 2005, asked about the fate of the 200 million "climate exiles" expected to be driven from their homes by rising ocean levels. They calculated that, based on national emissions of greenhouse gases, the U.S. should absorb 21 percent of these, or up to half

a million annually “for seventy years or so” until all are relocated. Their estimates may have been vastly low. In April 2007, a panel of eleven retired admirals and generals issued a report on climate change as a “threat multiplier.” They estimated that rising ocean levels threatened to dislodge many of the four *billion* Asians living within forty-five miles of the coast.

Thus the future holds ever more massive pressures from foreigners wishing, demanding, to come to America. Some of them would be Islamic terrorists or potential recruits. As a body, whatever the mixture of “hardworking and law abiding” and the smaller number of actual and potential recruits for Jihad, they expand the national population and make more difficult the nation’s efforts to cope with global warming and other environmental and resource problems. It is increasingly clear that we enter this future with our national immune system down. We have been on a sustained diet of large-scale immigration, the wrong way to prepare for this new future.

As we have learned, immigration is not an individual and isolated act, but a collective process that develops momentum, especially in countries like our own whose selection policies give greatest weight to kinship ties. When very large numbers come over many decades, networks of information and kinship strengthen, ethnic lobbies in the new homeland develop political skills and audacity as they manipulate a growing diaspora, refugee agencies using government funds siphon in their clients, and employers demand endlessly replenished cheap foreign labor. To prepare for a world in which global warming not only demands a lighter American population footprint but also expands the range of ecological harms and joins with civil wars and failed states to dislodge unprecedented millions, the last thing the globe’s chief carbon producer nation should do is to schedule four to five decades of million-plus annual influx, augmenting immigration momentum and foreign-born diaspora populations to a peak that continues to rise. Population stabilization, the *sine qua non* of sustainability, is incessantly pushed farther out of reach.

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Mass immigration is re-shaping America in another way as it joins forces with other social developments tending to fragment the nation. John Tanton once said of a particular legislative battle over

immigration that it was “only a skirmish in a wider war” over American identity and cohesion. He was in good company in perceiving this. What Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. called *The Disuniting of America* in his 1991 book has been a major theme in our intellectual life as the twentieth century yielded to the twenty-first.

Social fragmentation has many sources, and Schlesinger joined many “disuniting writers” in avoiding the immigration issue. His main concern was the trend among the new generation of historians of emphasizing celebratory treatment of various ethno-racial minorities in place of a common story. He had little to say about the incoming waves of newcomers bringing foreign allegiances, cultures and languages, instead indicting as the major nation-divider the new cultural force called multiculturalism. It was, initially a welcoming spirit toward ethnic and racial diversity but grew into a critique of assimilation and denial of a shared national history. Robert Pickus of the Bay Area World Without War Council helpfully enlarged this list, attributing “the profound erosion of common ground in America” to several “separatist realities in American life...Duke’s English Department, corporate America, religious decay or religious assertiveness, Hollywood, and the media.”

“The balance,” Schlesinger concluded his book, “is shifting from Unum to Pluribus.”

Have we become, asked Richard E. Morgan in *Disabling America* (1999), “simply a collection of ethnics huddled around a standard of living?”

*Time* asked, “Who Are We?” on the cover of the July 8, 1991 issue, and asked a group of intellectuals, “What Do We Have in Common?”

Most gave the politically correct and entirely unconvincing answer: “Diversity.”

Historian John Higham noted in 1997 that “ethno-racial tensions are acute and in some ways growing. Are we witnessing an approaching end of nation-building itself?...an erosion of the nation-state, as its capacity to maintain national borders and an effective national center weakens?”

These and other commentators on societal fragmentation at the end of the twentieth century tended to locate the causes in the cultural divides opened in the Sixties and in globalization’s sapping of the powers of the nation state. They dodged the

immigration issue as Schlesinger had done—warned by friends that they would be “called bad names.” But others—Georgie Anne Geyer, Brent Nelson, Laurence Auster, Pat Buchanan, Robert Kaplan, Samuel Huntington and Juan Enriquez, to mention only a few—had the courage to address this fundamental source of the apparent unwinding of social bonds in contemporary America. In their books and essays they found assimilation of incoming foreigners faltering as the incoming numbers increased and the host culture lost its confidence. The national print media also weighed in. *Newsweek* offered a major story on demographic trends in January, 1997, and saw ahead an America “crowded, mean-spirited and glum—a balkanized nation increasingly split between have’s and have-nots, old and young, and immigrants and the native-born,” with a population rising by 2050 to “more than 500 million persons” in which whites are a minority.

President Clinton joined this conversation in 1998—or, perhaps future research in his presidential papers will require us to say, the president’s speechwriters prepared a commentary for him on what a century earlier had been called, “The National Question.” In a speech at Portland State University in Oregon, Clinton noted that “a new wave of immigration, larger than any in a century, far more diverse than any in our history,” means that there will be “no majority race” in California in five years and in the U.S. in fifty. “Unless we handle this well, immigration of this sweep and scope could threaten the bonds of our union.”

Clinton dropped the subject, but had he been serious about the issue or less timid he might have appointed a National Commission on Bonds of Our Union. Then there would have come under scrutiny many worrisome trends to assess along with “a new wave of immigration.” The Commission would surely have pondered historic lows reached in poll-measured public trust in government and society’s major institutions; the growth of the underground off-the-books economy; the shift in the generation and consumption of news from three television channels and one or two local newspapers in every metropolis to the information-splintering of hundreds of television channels and an expanding universe of four million internet blogs; the growth of gated communities; public school systems losing students to private schools and homeschooling. Such an inquiry would have strongly suggested that the

bonds of union were weakening, and the end of the twentieth century had been a poor time to admit the largest immigrant streams in our history.

Nations, after all, are not eternal, but can unravel, which seemed to be “the tendency of our time,” wrote British-born American immigrant and historian Niall Ferguson in 2001. The drift of contemporary history “is for existing political units to fragment.” The consolidation of nation-states that multiplied the number of independent countries in the world in 1871 (excluding sub-Saharan Africa) from sixty-four to fifty-nine was reversed after World War II, with eighty-nine counted by 1950 and 102 by 1995. As the twenty-first century began, 200 territories or ethnic groups were seeking secession from larger units, providing much of the international news due to conflicts in places like Serbia-Kosovo, Iraq, Russia, Tibetan China, Sierra Leone, Sudan, Belgium, Scotland, Spain, and Canada.

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What about the United States? Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan noted in his 1993 book, *Pandemonium*, that the splintering of nations would perhaps lead to the formation of fifty to 150 new nations in the next fifty years. “Some of them in North America? Possibly.” Was he thinking of Canada? Perhaps Quebec is a secessionist possibility, but surely one need not take seriously the strong support in Hawaii and even in the U.S. Senate for a proposed Native Hawaiian Reorganization Act which would create a sovereign government for 400,000 “native Hawaiians” and “allow for the complete legal and territorial independence from the United States.” Or the convening in Burlington, Vermont in November, 2006, of the First North American Secessionist Convention?

What of our own Southwest, a region taken from Mexico by force only six generations earlier and receiving a sustained flow of Mexicans, a unique population of immigrants from a country with a 2,000 mile common border and whose numbers accounted for one-third of all immigrants in the U.S. and 60 percent of all illegals. This northward flow of Mexicans was not tapering off, but had sustained momentum into the future. The Mexican government estimated thirty more years of immigration flow at 400,000 or more a year.

Was this in effect a “peaceful invasion” aiming at

irredentism—in Spanish, a *Reconquista* of territory lost a century and a half ago?

Some Mexican and Mexican-American politicians as well as tenured professors of Chicano Studies at American universities openly and proudly call it just that. Mexican President Ernesto Zedillo in 1995 said to a rally in Chicago: “I have proudly proclaimed that the Mexican nation extends beyond the territory enclosed by its borders and that Mexican migrants are an important, a very important part of it.” (Translated from the Spanish) “California is going to be a Hispanic state, and if you don’t like it you should leave,” said Mario Obledo of the Mexican-American Legal Defense and Education Fund in the early 1990s. “*Somos Mexicanos!*” shouted the Speaker of the California Assembly (now Mayor of Los Angeles) Antonio Villaraigosa at a 1997 rally: “The question is not whether *reconquista* will take place, but how and with what consequences?” Mexican writer Carlos Loret de Mola wrote in the Mexico City newspaper, *Excelsior*:

*A peaceful mass of people, hardworking, carries out slowly and patiently an unstoppable invasion, the most important in human history...a large migratory wave by an ant-like multitude, stubborn, unarmed, and carried on in the face of the most powerful and best-armed nation on earth.*

Can this chauvinism be dismissed as merely over-heated posturing and blather from politicians who sense a cheap way to appeal to their ethnic flock and who know the rest of America will meekly ignore contemptuous political speeches of this sort? Well, there is more than just rhetoric here. The Mexican government has an aggressive policy pursued since 1990 under three presidents—“*acercamiento*,” or getting closer to “Mexican communities abroad.” Programs run out of Mexican consulates in American cities promote national ties, solidarity and language maintenance among Mexicans and Mexican-Americans north of the border. Presidente Vicente Fox said he was president of 125 million Mexicans—one hundred in Mexico, and 25 million in the U.S. who could lobby the American government for whatever Mexico City wanted. “We feel that in the future, Mexico can use us,” said the Chairman of LULAC Eduardo Morga, “as Israel uses American Jews, as Italy uses Italian-Americans.” Use us as an ethnic pressure group with primary allegiances elsewhere.

These political and cultural activities within the Mexican diaspora in the U.S. are minimized by some, under the assumption that Mexican governments are notoriously incompetent and can hardly hold their own nation together, let alone secure a beachhead in El Norte. Yet undeniably the demographics project unprecedented and unpredictable change in many parts of the U.S. Stanford historian David Kennedy wrote in 1996 that it was the first time in our history that one-third of the immigrants to the U.S. came “flowing into a defined region from a single cultural, linguistic and national source—Mexico. The possibility looms that in the next generation or so we will see a kind of Chicano Quebec take shape in the American Southwest.” In 2001, a majority of births in California were Hispanic, as were 72 percent of the students in Los Angeles public schools. “The United States is becoming a Latino nation,” Jorge Ramos asserted in *The Latino Wave* (2004), a hybrid; not part of Mexico but decidedly, especially in the Southwest, Latinized. Victor Davis Hanson, California rancher and historian, wrote that his home state of California was becoming a place he called “Mexifornia” in his book of that name, a “hybrid civilization” taking form across the entire southwest in which “Spanish is coequal with English, poverty becomes endemic... schools erode, crime soars, and integration and Americanization falter.”

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In these and other areas, the glue seems not to be holding across the American nation. Samuel Huntington reports in *Who Are We?* that nineteen scholars were asked to evaluate the level of “American national integration” over time, and on a scale of one to five, with one the highest, they rated 1930 at 1.71, 1950 at 1.46, 1970 at 2.65, and 1990 at 2.60. Scholars from many disciplines, Huntington reports, perceive “the eclipse of nationhood,” “faded patriotism,” “the devaluation of American citizenship,” and speak of the U.S. in the early twenty-first century as moving into a “transnational era.” Historian John Higham, who had become an advocate of immigration restriction despite his reputation of a critic of that persuasion, wrote in 1997: “Ethno-racial tensions are acute and in some ways growing. Are we witnessing an approaching end of nation-building itself? An erosion of the nation-state, as its capacity to maintain national borders and an effective national center weakens?” And in 1999,

Higham again wrote: "Nation-building has collapsed both as strategy and concern, particularly in the high culture of the academic world. If so, immigration may prove to be just an aspect of a wider social fragmentation." Aspect and major contributing cause.

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## **A Future-Aligned Alternative Immigration Policy**

The central message of our immigration reductionist social movement over three decades has been making the case that a small immigration regime, with different selection criteria, is in the national interest for multiple reasons, and must replace the costly Expansionist tidal wave authorized in 1965. We have made this case with many voices for thirty years, and have built a social movement organized from tiny grassroots groups upward to several national organizations. We did not turn immigration policy decisively our way; indeed, we saw matters worsen. More of that may lie ahead.

But to me this is not yet a narrative of defeat. When the American feminists met at Seneca Falls in 1848, they did not imagine that the right to vote would come only after seventy-two years of struggle. Social movements to bring fundamental change to this large country have a history that teaches patience driven by determination. Still, it is fair for activists to ask: "What did we get for all the small and large contributions of money, of faxes sent to senators and letters to editors and meetings small and large?" Not yet the turnaround we seek. Yet we have awakened, encouraged and empowered many Americans, have won some small skirmishes, and have recently fought off a disastrous Expansionist campaign, and are well organized, Mainstreet to Washington, for the next stage of the struggle.

Most important, in the historical shadow of an earlier immigration restriction movement, we managed to craft a new language and tone—immigration reform toward lower numbers, again, but this time without the nineteenth century's nativism or xenophobia, without disparaging immigrants or their cultures, reserving condemnation for our own incompetent and shortsighted public officials and ethnocentric lobbyists rather than the immigrants caught in the mighty currents of globalization.

In the language of the civil rights movement,

being in "the struggle" was in a sense its own reward. As I served four years in the Navy Reserve and three years on active duty with the U. S. Marines, I thought this met the needs of my patriotic impulses. My professional career led me into the world of research university academics, a world of dedicated and admirable people. But in the contemporary university world, patriotism is a forgotten if not thought to be a distasteful, war-starting term. Immigration reform brought me into association with people who had glimpsed a problem ahead for our nation and our children, and made time in their lives to try to steer the nation in a different and better direction, at the cost of attacks on their character and values. That is patriotism in its best sense, taking hold of a precious out-of-uniform opportunity to pay some of your debt. As Dick Lamm once said, "We are trying to go beyond being Good Citizens, and be also Good Ancestors."

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Most of our energies over these years have gone toward a critique of the mass immigration regime regrettably legitimated in 1965. We were obliged to speak more about what we were against—that half-illegal and badly flawed immigration system in place—than about what we were for. It is my hope that this book has introduced readers to an admirable cohort of re-thinkers and reformers, who have thought deeply about the design and purpose of America's reformed new immigration policy in our vastly changed domestic and global circumstances.

No one to my knowledge has suggested an appealing label for the reformed immigration regime we seek. There is an appealing (to me) movement for Slow Food, and Slow Cities, and even Slow Medicine. Slow Immigration?

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The movement now needs a political leadership that Ross Perot and Pete Wilson could not (for different reasons) give it in the 1990s, nor Tom Tancredo and Duncan Hunter in their runs for the presidency in 2007-2008.

There are constituencies across the left-center-right spectrum for a reduced immigration regime—one that aims at zero-sum or replacement immigration to make possible the goals of environmentalists and energy de-carbonizers; a flow cut down in size so

as to pose little labor market competition inside the American workplace; a flow small enough to facilitate assimilation and national security monitoring; and an immigration stream that is entirely legal, bringing firmly to an end the deeply corrupting flaunting of law and the loathsome criminal importation of the foreign and underground component of our two-tiered population.

These components must be politically held together by a vision that other nations might one day adopt, when we offer to the world a model of an appropriately-sized population with altered lifestyles, passing on a sustainable ecology and economy to our posterity. Essential to this vision is public recognition that, whatever your cause, it's a lost cause without population stabilization at sustainable levels. This means a return to small immigration, for our foreseeable future.

The politics of this are there to be pulled together by a leader of superb educational gifts, as Theodore Roosevelt, with the help of a mobilized citizenry, thrust a new crusade, conservation, to the foreground a century ago. Another President Roosevelt gave a new reform vision and national goal a name when campaigning in 1932. The "New Deal," you anticipate? That is the label the press fastened upon FDR's plans, and he was happy with the label. But in another speech that same year he spoke from his environmentalist convictions, calling for changes aimed at the realization of "a Permanent Country." That is a national goal that must replace endless growth, requiring an immigration policy that forwards that goal rather than driving it out of reach.

And in New York harbor a re-named monument: Sustainability, Enlightening the World.

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